KIM Report

Bye-Bye Dubai

Posted by David

Aftershocks

The recent plea from the Dubai sovereign wealth fund, Dubai World, for a moratorium on payments to their $59 billion (USD) debt underscores that there are still plenty of skeletons in the closet to be found as the world economy races and stalls back to recovery. Sometimes this engine even goes backwards for a bit in the face of surprising news such as this.

Is this revelation really so surprising? Perhaps in the particular details and that it involves a supposedly wealthy country backed by decades of high oil production revenues. Or at least it was before it invested a good bit of that money to finance the hyper-development of a previously sleepy Arabian emirate. However, it is not surprising that large negative developments continue to come to light as the financial systems recover and consolidate. It took many years of unchecked greed and financial short-sightedness to create the crisis (crises?) that started in 2007. It is only logical that it will be a few years until we are free of this baggage.

What does this mean for commodities? The “good times” are gone and many investors/developers now have to deal with an annoying factor known as “reality” when they are interpreting the market, supply/demand trends, and so forth.

This whole topic is too big for one article and it would be redundant, not to mention exhausting, to focus on an all-encompassing review of things as they stand and look to do so in the future. Following the news of Dubai World’s troubles made me think of all the discretionary luxury goods (haute couture, man-made islands shaped-like things, and particularly jewellery) that are disproportionately consumed by such a rather small population, and how that allegory can be expanded to the world at large.

Are those we previously thought to be ultra-rich truly immune to economic fluctuations? It really is a relative matter, but it appears that the 2007-2009 meltdown(s) has (have) even touched those we thought to be dependable for the consumption of commodities of limited practicality. Diamonds (and other gems) are perhaps the best example of such an item. They can be synthesized easily now for aesthetic and industrial purposes, leaving natural diamonds of no particular commercial use aside from vanity and symbolism.

However, it is the rarity, history, and symbolism/mystique surrounding natural diamonds that makes them so sought after, even in troubled economic times such as now.

This recent reprieve in the markets over the past six months has been accompanied by bursts of positive news releases from a previously lacklustre Canadian diamond exploration sector. This recovery was second to only that seen by rare earth metals in the past few months.

Peregrine First Out of the Gate

The major catalyst for this renewed interest in diamond properties in 2009 was the Chidliak discovery on Baffin Island. Although the most recent news from Peregrine (and JV partner BHP Billiton) was less than stellar compared to previous developments, the Chidliak-Qilaq project is the first diamondiferous kimberlite discovery in Canada in years to hold significant economic potential. PGD stock has relaxed from its surprising highs in September-October stable levels at well over $1. The nature of the Chidliak find was covered in an earlier article back in March. What is interesting in recent months is the lag time for the market to acknowledge this find: about six months since its first real publicity at a sparsely attended PDAC session on diamond exploration.

Shore Pushes Onwards

Two other major players in the Canadian diamond junior sector have seen stock jumps more closely tied to news releases. Shore Gold released its most recent NI 43-101 complaint report concerning the Orion South kimberlite body in the Fort a la Corne (FalC) JV project with Newmont in Saskatchewan (not to be confused with the adjacent Star property wholly owned by SGF). This technical report and resource estimate is lengthy at 108 pages, as it should be considering the complex geology found in the FalC pipe compared to some other Canadian kimberlites (e.g. Snap Lake, Lynx). The bulk of the geological characteristics of the FalC kimberlites were covered in an earlier KIM Report article. The main issues indicated with that article over a year ago was for SGF to up their average diamond valuations due to grades well below 1 ct/t (100 cpht), and to give a reasonable estimate of the total mining cost per ton. The proximity of local communities and their infrastructure (power, roads, etc.) will bring costs down well below those of Arctic projects. But by how much? P&E Mining Consultants do a very thorough job of considering all technical aspects of the most promising body of the 70+ in the FalC project.

SGF and NEM commissioned WWW International Diamond Consultants Ltd. to evaluate the diamonds recovered from underground and LDDH samples. 2320.2 c was priced at $199495 (US), or $86/c (using the March 11 2008 pricing). The most promising units of the Orion South kimberlite: EJF and P-2 had price ranges of $100-166/c and $91-123/c, respectively. Diamonds from other lithologies of Orion South have lower valuations. P&E optimistically use the high end values for their modelling of the resource. This is significantly lower than the $225/c valuation at Star, located 2.5 km to the SE. Grades range from 0.128-0.147c/t depending on the case used. Tonnage (minimum case) is 76.8 Mt indicated and 86.3 Mt inferred.

The mining plan for Orion South suggests an open pit. Slope of the pit wall would be 30º for the ore/waste rock and 18º for the overburden due to its unconsolidated nature.

Mining costs are hard to put together from just reading the report. It assumes that the exchange rate will be US$0.85/CAD$. Stripping costs for the overburden (glacial till) will be $1/t overburden, with mining, processing, and general/administrative costs pegged at $6.54/t kimberlite. Thus using the absolute minimum values SGF and NEM look to clear about $4/t (rough estimate for overburden clearance) from Orion. Though should aspects such as US-CAD exchange rates, rough diamond prices, and/or fuel prices strongly fluctuate, this number could go much higher or lower. The key assumption being made here -as with all deposits, is that the modelled resource accurately reflects the real resource in the ground closely enough that it remains economic. The major difficulty with the FalC kimberlites is that their petrological/lithological heterogeneity (i.e. changes in diamond grade throughout zones in the kimberlite body) is difficult to pin down. The overall low grade of the pipe and mediocre diamond valuation (compared to other pipes with grades <0.5c/t) leaves little room for mistakes, mistakes that SGF and NEM have spent years and millions of dollars to avoid.

At its conclusion the Orion South/Star project requires a further $4.5 million to bring things to the feasibility stage, not all that much compared to the aggregate amount spent on developing the FalC kimberlites since their discovery in the late 1980s.

Last, But Not Least

The second major junior in the Canadian sector is Stornoway. This has followed the trend set by Peregrine and then Shore Gold in a resurgent Canadian diamond exploration sector. First reporting 4x the original tonnage for the Renard-2 kimberlite property in early October and then expanding on that find this month by reporting revised numbers for entire Foxtrot (Renard, Lynx, and Hibou bodies) property (aka the Renard Diamond Project) that effectively triple the contained carats compared to estimates published last year. 23.0 Mc are indicated and 13.3 Mc are inferred with further upside as some bodies remain not fully studied. Grades at Renard-2 for indicated (1.03 c/t) and inferred (1.2 c/t) resources are up 27% and 39% respectively.

There is a bit of cloud to this silver lining though in that diamond valuations from Renard-2 and -3 are down 3% to US$117/c and for Lynx down 14% to $57/c (“Base Case” estimates). The NI 43-101 compliant technical report covering this release will be out in less than 45 days.

Considering these developments it is curious if any other diamond juniors will be lucky enough to come across some positive news in order to be next in line to capitalize on this new, but fragile, enthusiasm. With the tax-loss selling season approaching, that enthusiasm is fragile indeed.

Disclaimer: The author owns 4000 shares of SWY. This article is based on the personal opinions and experience of the author. Please conduct due diligence when investing. ©KIM Report 2009 www.kimreport.com

Large carats at Gahcho Kue, worth the wait?

Posted by David

Earlier this month, Mountain Province Diamonds (TSX-MPV, AMEX-MDM) dropped a big rock in the otherwise stagnant waters of diamond exploration and investment. The company announced that they had recovered a 25.13 c colourless octahedral diamond of exceptional clarity from the Tuzo kimberlite in the Gahcho Kue cluster, Northwest Territories. This diamond was valued at approximately (USD) $17,500/c, or $439,775 total. This is the largest diamond recovered in Canada during an exploration project. 

 

MPV discovered the Gahcho Kue cluster, which lies in the AK property in the Kennady Lake region. It owns 49% of the project, with De Beers Canada as the operator and majority stake holder. The geologic environment of the project is in the southeast Slave craton. The cluster was discovered in 1997 and DeBeers Canada (then Monopros) was quickly brought in as a JV partner where is could earn up to 51% of the project by shouldering a large portion of the costs. DeBeers has since exercised this option. Four main kimberlite bodies comprise the cluster (see map): Tuzo, 5034, Hearne, and Tesla. Tesla is not currently considered to be a resource as its small surface area, 0.4 hectares, is less than one third that of the next largest body: Tuzo at 1.4 hectares.

 

The geology of the three currently economic pipes is varied. 5034 is an irregular body of hypabyssal kimberlite, Hearne is a mix of hypabyssal and diatreme facies kimberlite, and Tuzo is believed to be the deeper part of a diatreme with no root zone found as of yet. These bodies together create a large reserve of ore that has been thoroughly drilled and modeled over the past decade. In a general way the geology could be seen as an intermediate between the Churchill (Stornoway Diamonds & Shear Minerals) and Snap Lake (De Beers Canada) projects that are entirely hypabyssal kimberlite and the Fort a la Corne (Shore Gold & Newmont) project where all of the kimberlite found is pyroclastic or resedimented pyroclastic.

 

The diamond was recovered from LDDH sampling in March of this year. After the sampling was completed the kimberlite was made into a concentrate at De Beers’ Grand Prairie, Alberta facility and then shipped to the GEMDL laboratory in South Africa (also run by De Beers) to recover the remaining diamonds. When this in completed, the diamonds will be sent to the DTC facility in London, U.K., for cleaning and valuation.

 

Of the three main kimberlites, Tuzo is the least developed in terms of sampling. The recent bulk sample was in part an effort to rectify this. 5034 has 8.7 Mt of indicated ore at 1.6 c/t and 4.9 Mt of inferred ore at 1.7 c/t. Hearne has 5.7 Mt of indicated ore at 1.7 c/t and 1.5 Mt of inferred ore at 1.53 c/t. Tuzo, meanwhile only has 10.6 Mt of inferred ore at 1.15 c/t.  MPV and De Beers are trying to remove the uncertainty with this body. For comparative purposes Diavik a few hundred km to the north has about 29.8 Mt of reserves in total at 3.2 c/t (measured+indicated), or 95.36 Mc. Thus far, Gahcho Kue has about 46 Mc (indicated+inferred). Keep in mind that the Diavik mine has unusually high grade. MPV estimates a mine life of about 24 years.

 

In terms of diamond valuation, an independent 2006 report by WWW International Diamond Consultants Ltd. gave (in USD) $101/c for 5034, $54/c for Hearne, and $43/c for Tuzo. The average for all three pipes was $75/c and it was noted that proper cleaning (usually in a hot acid bath) would raise the value of many of the diamonds by up to 10%.

 

It has been over ten years since the discovery at Gahcho Kue. Mining is expected to begin in full by 2012, giving about a fourteen year lag between discovery and mine. Diavik took only ten years in total to begin full capacity mining and Ekati took even less. Following statements for interviews with MPV management, it would seem that they would prefer a faster to-mine plan, but De Beers has preferred a more methodical approach. In light of what happened at Jericho with Tahera, perhaps this might be a more prudent option. Though perhaps De Beers has been focusing the bulk of its attention on their 100% owned Snap Lake and Victor projects in the Northwest Territories and Ontario, respectively.

 

Regardless of the slow timetable set for developing the project, the discovery of this diamond, along with other ones >5 c found in the past few years, has established the potential for large, high quality stones. As diamond price goes up exponentially with carat size, the profit margins for the future mine are looking larger. Now that above average grades, decent diamond values, and large, high quality, high value diamonds have been established at Gahcho Kue the main hurdle is to finance the project to completion as it will be about four years until commercial production. MPV needs about $370 million to fund its 49% share. The current market cap of the company is $280 million. The company has about $1.5 million net in cash and medium-term deposits, and has invested about $65 million in the project overall. While the sale of the diamond announced last week should pay for a few drill holes, in order to keep the full 49% share of the project MPV will undoubtedly require financing. This strategy may run into some resistance as diamonds are not a hot item in the current market and lenders in general are skittish after their collective failure to recognize the risks of sub prime mortgages and ABCP. Also, the fate of the aforementioned last diamond mine to open in the Arctic may be scaring way any potential suitors. Raising more capital by dilution is only a partial solution at this moment considering the vast funds involved. Although the company is not poorly positioned to issuing private placements effectively as its stock price has not suffered anywhere near to the degree that many of its peers have (mainly $4 to $5 over the past year). Another option is to default on their share of the costs and let De Beers’ deep pockets take care of things in return for letting their share slide to 40%. A third option that is being signaled by a strategic review of the company as alluded to in a National Post article last week is that the company may be putting itself up for sale.

 

Regardless of what option the company pursues, the nature of the deposit is likely to reap large rewards for shareholders when interest in the diamond market returns. What remains to be seen is that whether MPV chooses the option that gives the best gain to the shareholders.

 

Disclaimer: The author holds no shares of MPV. This article is based on the author’s personal research and experience. Please perform your own due diligence when investing.

 

The Stornoway without a Dion

Posted by David

To use an overused comparison in these current market climes, the diamond sector is the Rodney Dangerfield of mining stocks as it “don’t get no respect”. In this way, the diamond juniours are much like the official opposition (for the non-Canadian readers, Stornoway is also the name for the official residence of the leader of the opposition, currently Stephane Dion). To give a more focused discussion of the issue than did a previous article, presented is the case of Stornoway Diamonds (TSX-SWY).

 

The stock has been on a fairly steady decline since this time last year going from ~$1.20/share to about $0.37/share at current. Even the news that acclaimed diamond consultants – WWW International Diamond Consultants Ltd., had upped the estimated valuations for diamonds from the Renard kimberlites (Renard, together with the Lynx dykes, comprises the Foxtrot Property in Central Quebec, and is a 50/50 joint venture with SOQUEM Inc.) only caused a mere blip up from 0.35 to 0.43 that evaporated in the last two weeks.

 

In detail, the report displayed increased values for diamonds from Renard 2 and 3 (from U.S. $109/c to $121/c) and The North Complex Zone of Renard 4 ($69/c to $79/c), increases of 11% and 14% respectively. Since the pullback after the news, the stock has bounced around the mid thirty cent level. So what gives? The predominant idea here is that since last summer, most investors are still very wary of juniours, even ones with established and advance projects such as Foxtrot and, to a lesser extent, Churchill (joint venture with Shear Minerals). For Renard, the pre-feasibility study (NI 43-101 compliant) is due out sometime during this quarter and many investors may be waiting on that. The cost of a road to the potential mine site is one of the most speculated values.

 

Aside from Renard, the other properties in the Foxtrot property hold promise as well. The Lynx series of dykes produced a grade of 1.07 c/t from a 494 t bulk sample. Not enough sampling has been done to allow for a diamond valuation, but the sample did include a gem-quality octahedron weighing in at a whopping 21.53 c (pictured). A minibulk sample from the Hibou dyke, 1.3 km from the Renard bodies (see map), gave a grade of 1.26 c/t from 30.4 t of kimberlite. The largest stone from this sample was a 1.01 c octahedron.

 

After Renard, the next most advanced property is the Churchill project (JV with Shear Minerals), a series of kimberlite dykes located in the Churchill craton in Nunavut. This property was discussed the earlier Arctic Diamonds and Churchill articles.

 

SWY also holds a number of other advanced-level diamond prospects. The most promising of these is the group of eleven kimberlite bodies at Aviat on the Melville Peninsula, North of the aforementioned Churchill project. What really is really interesting about this project lately is the dense media separation results from January 2008 that reported a grade of 1.63 c/t from 20.6 t taken from the AV267 body, and included a 3.64 c stone. AV267 is a sheet-shaped body of macrocrystic hypabyssal kimberlite. Thus far, drilling has delineated AV267 to have an average thickness of 3 m and to extend at least 2000m along  strike and 500 m down dip (dip angle is 8-20 degrees). This is similar to the body at Snap Lake. Kahuna at Churchill is also similar in deposit shape, but it is a vertical sheet instead of the subhorizontal one at Aviat. The project began as a JV with SWY, BHP Billiton, and Hunter Exploration Group (a private firm). Last month SWY acquired BHP’s share of the project, making the split now 90% SWY and 10% Hunter. SWY also have 100% of the marketing rights for any Aviat stones.

 

SWY made news a couple of years back due to its aggressive takeover of Ashton Mining Canada. The main gain in this for SWY was the acquisition of Ashton’s share in the Foxtrot Project. SWY also gets a lot of press coverage because of its CEO, Eira Thomas, a celebrity in the diamond exploration industry due to her part in the discovery of the Diavik mine working for the then-juniour exploration company Aber Diamonds (now Harry Winston Diamonds). Her background and media appeal have made her popular with the press in an industry where companies are usually run by stolid old white guys. The acquisition of Ashton did not only add just properties to the company, but talent as well. Tom McCandless, a renowned and well-published specialist on North American diamonds (read Barren Lands by Kevin Krajick), stayed on with SWY as a consultant after the takeover and is now their chief mineralogist. Matt Manson, formerly VP marketing/technical services & control for Aber (now Harry Winston), came into SWY through the acquisition of Contact Diamond Corporation and is now company president.

 

In spite of these promising results and experienced management, SWY, like most diamond juniours, has been beaten into the ground. With the price at a severe low, investors will either shy away or look at the situation as a buying opportunity. SWY previously has been the focus of a lot of vitriol on investor bulletin boards such as www.stockhouse.com due to its aggressive takeover of Ashton, but shareholder crankiness aside, this is not the cause of the perceived downside.

 

SWY’s number one project is Foxtrot, specifically Renard. As a mine becomes more of a distinct possibility, the need for financing becomes impossible to ignore. Road and electricity access must be established, buildings erected, and equipment purchased. This will likely cost into the hundreds of millions of dollars. As of January 31^st, SWY had just under $18 million in cash and equivalents. Financing by dilution at current prices is unlikely, as management is a significant stockholder and do not want to see their equity devastated. That leaves turning to banks and the like for funds to construct the mine. The “subprime slime” that still sticks to financial institutions makes getting a loan far more difficult now than this time last year. However, considering the experience of the management and the premium nature of the properties, the choices made are likely to be in the best interests of the shareholders.

 

Disclaimer: The author holds 500 shares of SWY that he bought at $0.73/share and has only mildly freaked out about the price dropping to $0.37/share. This article is based on the personal opinions and experiences of the author. Please do your own due diligence when investing.